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ANALYSIS OF THE PPBE  







The Planning, Programming and Budgeting (PPB) system was introduced in the 
department of Defense (DoD) in the 1960’s to link strategies to programs that best satisfy 
the Nation’s policy objectives and fit within budget constraints.  Over the past 45 years, 
modifications were made to the PPB system, and it is now referred to as the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) system, but the original intent of PPB 
remains intact.  Traditionally, wars were funded initially with emergency supplemental 
funding until the cost of the war could be added into the baseline budget process.  The 
Global War on Terror (GWOT), now in its six year, continues to be funded outside the 
PPBE process through supplemental appropriations.  This project identifies and examines 
the key factors related to this deviation from the PPBE process.  The research analyzes 
the domestic environment in which PPB was originally implemented and the post 9/11 
environment in which it currently exists.  A comparative analysis is used to determine the 
reasons for the increased use of supplementals for baseline and GWOT funding in the last 
six years.  The project also identifies the implications of continued deviation from the 
PPBE process utilizing parallel budgeting processes.     
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The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting (PPB) process was introduced in the 
U.S. Department of Defense during the early 1960s in order to link strategies to the 
identified programs, within budget requirements, that most satisfy the Nation’s policy 
objectives. Previous budgeting systems were inadequate to the task and PPB took 
advantage of enhanced analytical techniques. Over the past 45 years, modifications were 
made to the PPB System, and it is now referred to as the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) System, but the original intent has remained intact.1 
Other federal agencies attempted to implement PPB-based systems but the reform only 
persisted within DoD. 
DoD used PPB to fund its activities throughout the Cold War, Vietnam, and the 
Post-Cold War period. It has been used during periods of conflict and of relative peace. 
Thousands of DoD employees work full-time on the various processes within PPBE. The 
strategic environment in which the system operates has undoubtedly changed over the 
decades, but the system for matching national security strategy to budgets has ably served 
the department. That is, until very recently. The Global War on Terror (GWOT), now in 
its sixth year, is being funded outside the PPBE system. Separate budget requests and 
emergency supplemental appropriations have funded the war while the baseline 
departmental request has been budgeted through PPBE and appropriated in the annual 
defense appropriation.  
A. OBJECTIVE 
The primary goal of this project is to examine and identify the key factors related 
to the fundamental change that has occurred to the PPBE process in the post 9/11 
environment. The research will analyze the domestic environment in which PPB was 
originally implemented and the post 9/11 environment in which it currently exists. A  
 
                                                 
1 Jerry L. McCaffery and L.R. Jones, “Reform of Program Budgeting in the Department of Defense,” 
International Public Management Review 6 (2) (2005): 141 – 145.  
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comparative analysis will be used as a basis to determine the reasons for the increased 
use of supplemental appropriations for baseline and GWOT funding in the last six years. 
In addition, the implications of using parallel budgeting processes are noted. 
The primary research question answered by this project is as follows: 
• How relevant is the PPBE process in the post 9/11 environment? 
To help reach this objective, the following supporting research questions will be 
explored: 
• What was the environment when DoD implemented the PPB process? 
• What was the original intent of the PPB process? 
• Why was the PPB process unsuccessful in other federal agencies? 
• How does the post 9/11 environment compare to the environment that 
existed when PPB was originally implemented? 
• How did DoD fund pre 9/11 contingency operations? 
• How are supplemental and baseline budget and appropriation processes 
different? 
• What budget processes have been utilized since 9/11? 
• What are the ramifications of utilizing processes parallel to the PPBE 
system? 
B.  SCOPE OF PROJECT 
The research and recommendations of this project were strictly limited to the 
Department of Defense and did not include the Department of Homeland Security. The 
factors that led to DoD’s implementation of the PPB process and identifiable causes 
leading other federal agencies to choose alternate budgeting processes were examined. A 
general overview of the agencies where PPB did not originally succeed was explored; 
however, an in-depth analysis of these agencies was not conducted. The current DoD 
budget process was compared to the original PPB process. Potential ramifications of 
continued use of parallel processes in the PPBE System were identified. Post 9/11 refers 
to the time that has elapsed since September 11, 2001.   
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The intent of this project was not to craft a new budgeting system, but rather to 
document and identify the existing processes. Detailed dollar amounts of items in the 
current budget were not critiqued; however, the categorization of certain budget line 
items was questioned. Lastly, the expenses incurred in support of GWOT are defined as 
post 9/11 contingency funding and do not include non-war-related items contained in 
supplemental appropriations such as Hurricane Katrina support. 
C.  METHODOLOGY 
A Political, Economic, Socio-Cultural, Technological, Ecological, and Legal 
(PESTEL) Analysis was utilized to define the 1960’s domestic and DoD environment; 
the DoD environment after 9/11 is also analyzed. The PESTEL Analysis identifies the 
factors that combine to form these respective environments.  
Scholarly journals and other existing literature studies were used as references to 
describe the intent of the original PPB implementation in DoD and the reasons for the 
failures of PPB in other federal agencies. The defined environments of these two time 
periods, the intent of PPB implementation and reasons for failure in other federal 
agencies serve as the basis for a comparative analysis between the period when PPB was 
originally implemented and the current post 9/11 period. 
DoD directives and regulations were utilized in analyzing the funding of pre-9/11 
contingency operations and in defining baseline and supplemental budgeting processes. 
Four interviews were conducted with civilian personnel either currently or previously 
involved in the PPBE process. These interviews were provided on a non-attribution basis 
by the participants.  The four people included an SES from the Army, a senior journalist 
from the Congressional Research Service, a professional staff member from the House 
Appropriations Committee on Defense, and a prior Deputy Director of OSD Program 
Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E). All of the interviews were conducted in person at the 
Pentagon, Capitol Hill, and offices located in the Washington, DC area. These four 
interviews accounted for over six hours of audio recordings and 61 pages of transcription. 
The interview transcriptions were coded to extract common themes. The interviews 
provided personal anecdotes and professional observations of historical and existing 
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PPBE operations and supplemental processes. Conclusions drawn from the methods 
previously described were used to determine the ramifications of the continued use of 
parallel processes in the PPBE System. 
D.  ORGANIZATION  
This study begins with an examination of the fitness of PPBE in the Department 
of Defense. This includes defining the purpose of PPBE and the entailing the process 
involved in each stage. The reasons for failure of the original PPB process and the 
agencies associated with these failures are summarized based on literature of the time. 
Chapter III explores the funding mechanisms and processes within the 
Department of Defense. The annual and supplemental appropriation processes are 
defined and explained in detail. A historical perspective of funding previous military 
contingencies is addressed and an examination of the differences between the two 
processes is evaluated and compared. The chapter concludes with a description of the 
methods used to fund GWOT in the post 9/11 environment. 
Chapter IV provides a comparative analysis using the Political, Economic, Socio-
Cultural, Technological, Ecological and Legal (PESTEL) Analysis model of the domestic 
environment at the time that PPB was originally implemented and the dynamic post 9/11 
environment that currently exists. The setting in which the PPBE System now operates 
has undoubtedly changed during this time period. The chapter concludes with an analysis 
of the effects of the post 9/11 environment on the PPBE process. 
Chapter V considers the consequences of utilizing processes parallel to the PPBE 
System in the post 9/11 environment. The chapter examines the results of continued 
deviations from PPBE and concludes with recommendations for further research.  
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II. FITNESS OF PPBE 
The Planning, Programming and Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) System serves 
as the Department of Defense’s (DoD) resource allocation system. In preparation for the 
analysis section of this document, this chapter provides an overall description of the 
purpose and processes of PPBE, an exploration of the reasons why the attempt to institute 
it government-wide failed, and an identification of the agencies where the system has 
failed.  
A.  PURPOSE OF PPB 
In 1966, President Johnson mandated that the Planning, Programming and 
Budgeting (PPB) System be implemented across the entire the federal government. This 
style of budgeting, commonly referred to as program budgeting, had been in use in the 
Department of Defense (DoD) since Robert McNamara implemented it in 1962.2 
Program Budgeting was revolutionary in nature as it sought to provide financial decision 
makers with a well planned and quantifiable method for choosing among available 
alternatives in support of policy objectives.3 PPB was the next step in the evolution of 
budget reform and built upon the expenditure controls systems introduced between 1920-
1935 (to ensure reliable accounting data) and the management decision-making tools 
provided by the performance budgeting initiatives of the 1950’s (introducing efficiency 
measures to managers).4 PPB would serve as the one-size-fits-all budgeting system for 
the entire federal government through continued use of reliable accounting systems, 
informed management decisions based on efficiency, and the addition of long-range 
planning and analysis of alternatives. 
On its most basic level, the purpose of PPB was to produce a plan, then programs 
to meet the objectives of the plan as well as a budget that funded the chosen programs 
                                                 
2 L. R. Jones and Jerry McCaffrey, Budgeting and Financial Management for National Defense 
(Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing, 2004), 89. 
3 Allen Schick, “The Road to PPB: The Stages of Budget Reform,” Public Administration Review, 
Vol. 26, No. 4 (December 1966): 243. 
4 Ibid. 
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within fiscal constraints.5 At a deeper level, PPB would serve these purposes by 
“converting the annual routine of preparing a budget into a conscious appraisal and 
formulation of future goals and policies.”6 Taking a longer time frame into account, when 
planning for budgeting, PPB would allow more informed decision to be made when 
choosing among available alternatives. Through the availability of more options and the 
deeper exploration of these options using the tools of systems analysis, PPB would 
optimally allocate resources when choosing the programs that satisfied policy 
objectives.7  
The reign of PPB as the singular form of budgeting for the federal government 
would be short lived, however. President Nixon retired PPB as the federal government’s 
sole form of budgeting in 1969.8 Nearly forty years later, the Department of Defense 
(DoD) is the stalwart federal agency that continues to use PPB. In 2003, DoD began to 
emphasize the importance of budget execution and changed the name from PPB to PPBE 
(Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution) System. Although the “E” was 
added, PPBE still retains the main tenets of the original PPB System. 
B.  CURRENT PPBE PROCESSES  
In May of 2003, Management Initiative Decision No. 913 (MID 913) transformed 
PPB into PPBE. In addition to adding execution as its own phase, MID 913 converted 
DoD’s principal resource allocation system from “an annual Program Objective 




                                                 
5 Department of Defense, “The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System,” DoD Directive 
7045.14 (May 22, 1984), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/704514.htm (accessed April 4, 
2008).  
6 Allen Schick, “The Road to PPB: The Stages of Budget Reform,” Public Administration Review, 
Vol. 26, No. 4, (December 1966): 244. 
7 Ibid., 254. 
8 L. R. Jones and Jerry McCaffrey, Budgeting and Financial Management for National Defense 
(Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing, 2004), 92. 
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cycle with DoD formulating two year budgets in the on-year (or even year) and using the 
off-year (or odd year) to focus on budget execution and program performance.”9 Figure 1 
illustrates four years of this two-year cycle. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Four Years in the Two Year Cycle10 
As the acronym indicates, PPBE consists of four phases. These phases occur 
sequentially but overlap one another at numerous points throughout the cycle. Figure 2 
illustrates that at any one point in time, multiple phases (of four-year budgets) are 
occurring simultaneously at different levels of the federal government and within DoD. 
                                                 
9 Department of Defense, Management Initiative Decision No. 913 (May 2004), 2.  
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Figure 2.   Budget Cycle at a Point in Time11 
Planning occurs throughout the process, with programming and budgeting 
overlapping under a single review, and execution occurring during each of the budget 
years. Each of these phases and the documents that comprise the cycle illustrated in 
Figures 1 and 2 will be discussed in turn to provide an overview of the PPBE processes. 
1.  The Planning Phase 
The planning phase is the first step in the PPBE process. Its goal is to determine 
and set forth a vision of how the military accomplishes some of the nation’s strategic 
objectives. The planning phase accomplishes this objective by focusing on: “defining the 
national military strategy necessary to help maintain national security and support U.S. 
foreign policy 2 to 7 years in the future; planning the integrated and balanced military 
                                                 
11 R. E. Sullivan Jr., ed., “Resource Allocation: The Formal Process,” Naval War College, February 1, 
2002.  
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forces necessary to accomplish that strategy; ensuring the necessary framework 
(including priorities) to manage DoD resources effectively for successful mission 
accomplishment consistent with national resource limitations; and providing decision 
options to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to help him assess the role of national 
defense in the formulation of national security policy and related decisions.”12 The 
ultimate output of the planning phase is the SECDEF’s Joint Programming Guidance 
(JPG). The JPG provides top down strategic guidance to the military, rooted in the 
overarching defense strategy from the executive branch, which drives the military force 
structure and fiscal decisions made in the programming phase.13 Figure 3 provides an 
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Figure 3.   The Planning Phase14 
                                                 
12 Department of Defense, “The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System,” DoD Directive 
7045.14 (May 22, 1984), Available from: http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/704514.htm 
(accessed April 4, 2008).  
13 L. R. Jones and Jerry McCaffrey, Budgeting and Financial Management for National Defense 
(Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing, 2004), 99. 
14 Philip Candrevam, PPBE Slides, MN3154, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, 
(Monterey, CA:  Naval Postgraduate School). 
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The planning phase receives its overarching direction from the executive branch. 
The President, along with inputs from his National Security Council and several other 
federal agencies, produces the National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS takes threats 
to the security of the United States into account in providing an overall defense strategy 
to mitigate these threats.15 The Secretary of Defense, in turn, issues the National Defense 
Strategy (NDS). The NDS lays out the SECDEF’s strategic objectives for DoD, based on 
the NSS, and provides his vision for meeting these objectives.16 The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS), also utilizing the guidance provided in the most current NSS, produce the National 
Military Strategy (NMS). The NMS provides the JCS’ advice on planning and providing 
the military capabilities required to meet the strategic objectives and intent as set forth by 
the NSS.17 The NSS, NDS, and NMS are updated sporadically as dictated by new 
administrations and/or as other events necessitate new strategies. In addition to the three 
planning documents, DoD also produces the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The 
QDR is performed every four years in the first year of each administration. It provides a 
plan for future force configuration, and is therefore, an input into the planning phase 
every fourth year.18 These documents are inputs into the PPBE process and provide broad 
and fiscally unconstrained planning direction from the President to the SECDEF and JCS 
by defining objectives designed to mitigate threats to national security. 
On an annual basis as part of the planning phase, the Combatant Commanders 
(COCOMs) address strategic concerns in their respective areas by issuing Integrated 
Priority Lists (IPLs), taking into account the objectives in the documents previously 
mentioned. In turn, the JCS produces the Joint Planning Document (JPD) to report the 
SECDEF’s annual Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG). The SPG sets forth the 
SECDEF’s strategic plan for developing and using future forces and may contain specific 
                                                 
15 L. R. Jones and Jerry McCaffrey, Budgeting and Financial Management for National Defense 
(Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing, 2004), 98. 
16 CAPT Lisa Potvin. Practical Financial Management: A Handbook for the Defense Department 
Financial Manager, 7th Ed. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. (November 2007), 39. 
17 L. R. Jones and Jerry McCaffrey, Budgeting and Financial Management for National Defense 
(Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing, 2004), 99. 
18 R. E. Sullivan, Jr. “The Department of Defense Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution 
(PPBE),” The U.S. Naval War College (January 2004): 3.  
 11
information on important “big ticket” programs.19 On a bi-annual basis, in even years, the 
CJCS utilizes the JPD and SPG as inputs and provides the SECDEF with specific 
programmatic recommendations through the issuance of the Chairman’s Program 
Recommendation (CPR). Utilizing the CPR, his own thoughts, and the planning 
documents previously mentioned, the SECDEF produces the JPG. The JPG is the final 
output of the planning phase and provides the SECDEF’s fiscal and programmatic 
guidance for efficiently allocating DoD’s resources in achieving the nations desired 
strategic objectives.20 
2.  The Programming Phase 
In the programming phase of the PPBE process, DoD develops the programs 
(equipment, technology, research and development, force configuration, infrastructure, 
etc.) required to support the planning objectives of the JPG and SPG.21 In even years (or 
“on years”), the first event of the programming phase is the DoD components’ 
development of Program Objective Memorandums (POMs). These initial POMs are 
documents reflecting a service’s priorities for allocation of resources across programs in 
their respective areas and include a risk assessment of the proposals. In developing 
POMs, the services follow the planning guidance provided by the SPG and JPG in 
choosing the best combination of programs that provide organizations, forces and 
equipment required to meet the objectives set forth in the phase. To choose this best 
combination of programs effectively, the services include inputs from the COCOMs, 
resource sponsors and the service headquarters. POMs cover a six year period that 
coincides with the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).22 In odd years (or “off years”), 
the first event of the programming phase is the services’ development of Program Change 
Proposals (PCP). These initial PCPs are developed by the respective services to provide 
                                                 
19 R. E. Sullivan, Jr. “The Department of Defense Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution 
(PPBE),” The U.S. Naval War College (January 2004): 3. 
20 Ibid. 
21 CAPT Lisa Potvin. Practical Financial Management: A Handbook for the Defense Department 
Financial Manager, 7th Ed. (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, November 2007), 44. 
22 R. E. Sullivan, Jr. “The Department of Defense Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution 
(PPBE), The U.S. Naval War College (January 2004): 12. 
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minor updates to the approved POMs in the “off years” to account for events that have 
impacted programmatic needs. Thus, the services’ initial POMs (in even years)/PCPs(in 
odd years) move to the next step in the programming phase; the program review process. 
The program review process occurs at the SECDEF level and ensures that the 
POMs/PCPs are aligned with the guidance provided by the current versions of the QDR, 
SPG and JPG, respectively. POMs/PCPs are reviewed by a combined team of analysts 
(known as the Program Review Group or PRG) from the services, Joint Staff and OSD to 
assess the level of compliance, provide alternatives to the current programs and assess the 
risk associated with the POM/PCP. This analysis is then vetted through the Three–Star 
Group, a group of 3-Star programmers from each of the services, who provides the final 
programmatic recommendations from this process to the SECDEF. Concurrent to the 
OSD programming process, the JCS also review the services POM/PCP submissions and 
provide its views, on the services’ proposals and associated risks, to the SECDEF in the 
form of the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA). If required, (in the opinion of the 
CJCS), the CPA will also provide alternative programmatic recommendations for 
achieving the capabilities necessary to satisfy the objectives set forth in the planning 
phase.23 The CPA and inputs from the 3-Star Group are then forwarded to the Senior 
Leadership Review Group (SLRG). This group, chaired by the Deputy SECDEF, through 
the annual issuance of the Program Decision Memorandums (PDMs) approves the 
POMs/PCPs as presented or provides instruction on necessary modifications to the 
services.24 The issuance of the PDMs signals the end of the programming phase and 
through this process and its final outputs, the SECDEF allocates DoD’s resources among 
competing/complementing programs to match capabilities with objectives. With the 
PDMs issued and the changes incorporated, the services hold approved POMs/PCPs. 
Figure 4 depicts the even-year programming and budgeting phases, and Figure 5, the 
odd-year programming and budgeting phases. Only those terms relevant to this study will 
be described.  
                                                 
23 R. E. Sullivan, Jr. “The Department of Defense Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution 
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3.  The Budgeting Phase 
The budgeting phase begins with the service components converting the 
programmatic decisions from their original POM/PCP submissions into detailed cost 
estimates capable of funding the programs within the POM/PCP for the budget year.27 
These cost estimates are submitted by the services in even years to OSD in the form of 
Budget Estimate Submissions (BES). Each BES contains four years of budgetary data; 
the previous, current and next two years. In odd years, the services provide OSD with 
Budget Change Proposals (BCPs) to make changes to the baseline budget as events or 
issues dictate. Since the budgeting phase begins before the programming phase ends, the 
BES/BCP is refined as it moves through its own review process and is affected by the 
programmatic decisions announced within the PDM. 
BES submissions from the services are compiled utilizing inputs from all levels 
within their respective organizations. Guidelines for budget requests are submitted from 
the service heads down through their organizations. Budget requests originate at the field 
activity level, travel back up through the chain of command, and eventually end up at the 
service headquarters. At all levels, these budget requests are checked for accuracy, 
correct costing procedures and compliance with guidelines. Issues are resolved 
throughout the process through budget hearings, the changing of budget requests, and the 
inclusion of additional inputs from operational commands and resource sponsors.28 With 
budget requests from the entire organization submitted, combined and issues resolved, 
the services hold their completed initial BES.     
After the services have reviewed their BES/BCP, it is submitted for review to 
OSD and OMB. Both of these agencies ensure compliance with the fiscal guidance 
provided by the JPG, OMB circulars and any other guidance issued.29 The Under 
Secretary of Defense Comptroller (USD(C)) verifies this compliance through holding 
                                                 
27 L. R. Jones and Jerry McCaffrey, Budgeting and Financial Management for National Defense 
(Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing, 2004), 101. 
28 Ibid., 114. 
29 CAPT Lisa Potvin, Practical Financial Management: A Handbook for the Defense Department 
Financial Manager, 7th Ed. (Monterey, CA:  Naval Postgraduate School, November 2007), 50. 
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budget hearings to request additional supporting information, reviewing pricing 
information on the programs and ensuring the budgeting decisions align with the 
SECDEF’s programmatic decisions.30 Once this review is complete, the USD (C) 
submits documents called Program Budget Decisions (PBDs) to the Deputy SECDEF 
that represent valid, correct and fully vetted (below SECDEF level) funding estimates for 
the programs within DoD. After Deputy SECDEF approves the PBDs, they are provided 
to the services. The services are then allowed to appeal any PBDs with which they 
disagree. Any large dollar issues that cannot be resolved are pushed forward as Major 
Budget Issues (MBIs). Some MBIs may have to be ultimately resolved at the SECDEF or 
presidential level. After all final budgeting decisions are resolved (if not agreed upon), 
the USD (C) combines all the budgetary data for DoD and submits them for inclusion in 
the President’s Budget (PB). 
4.  The Execution Phase 
The final phase of the PPBE process, the execution phase, begins with Congress 
authorizing and appropriating the funding for DoD. Once these steps are complete, DoD 
submits specific and phased plans on how it intends to spend its funding to Congress as 
part of the apportionment process. When the apportionment plan is approved, DoD 
begins distributing budget authority to its various components for further distribution 
down to command level for commitment, obligation, expenditure and outlay. During the 
execution phase, comptrollers and managers at all levels of the federal government and 
DoD monitor the spending process for adherence to the original plans set forth in the 
allotment process and the planning, programming and budgeting phases.31 DoD conducts 
a mid-year review to determine if funding within the department should be shifted to 
cover new or higher priority needs. At the end of the fiscal year, DoD reconciles its  
 
 
                                                 
30 R. E. Sullivan, Jr., “The Department of Defense Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution 
(PPBE),” The U.S. Naval War College (January 2004): 12.  
31 L. R. Jones and Jerry McCaffrey, Budgeting and Financial Management for National Defense 
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accounts with appropriations, closes its annual accounts and concludes the execution 
phase by initiating auditing and reporting programs within its various 
accounts/agencies/services.32 
PPBE is DoD’s current resource allocation system that links spending to 
programs that support the nation’s security objectives. Through planning, programming, 
budgeting and execution, DoD seeks to allocate the nations resources efficiently and 
effectively. This section has provided a U.S. theoretical map of how the PPBE System is 
designed to function and provides a base of comparison against the way the PPBE 
System is currently functioning. 
C.  PPB SUCCESS FACTORS 
As discussed previously, the reign of PPB as the government-wide budgeting 
system was short lived. This section reviews previous studies on the success of PPB, the 
factors that led to DoD’s success, and compares the agencies where PPB failed in relation 
to those success factors. 
Robert McNamara was the ultimate advocate of the PPB system. He had used 
program budgeting at Ford Motor Company33. He believed in this form of budgeting and 
introduced the system within DoD. As the Secretary of Defense, he was able to order the 
implementation of PPB and possessed the power to see it through. This was an easy sell 
for McNamara; however, because he understood program budgeting so well, he was able 
to use the analytical tools that comprised the system to make better decisions for the 
organization and get the organization onboard with his belief in the system.34 
The Ford system was adapted and specifically fit the needs of DoD. It was not a 
one-size-fits-all adoption from another agency within the federal government. It was also 
ideal for implementation within DoD because of the inherent needs for planning both 
within the PPB system and within DoD. The introduction of planning into a budgeting 
                                                 
32 L. R. Jones and Jerry McCaffrey, Budgeting and Financial Management for National Defense 
(Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing, 2004), 102. 
33 Ibid., 89.  
34 Aaron Wildavsky, “Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 29, 
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system was not much of a stretch for DoD as it was accustomed to continuous operational 
planning for actual events as well as contingencies.35 Tying dollar amounts to programs 
that provided capabilities to satisfy objectives was not an illogical step for DoD. Service 
components within DoD saw the opportunity for more funding if they were able to use 
the system well and effectively tie their programs to objectives.36 
The DoD workforce was comprised of people with unique, analytical skill sets 
required to conduct this type of analysis and the experience necessary to run a 
functioning PPB system. This small group of people within DoD had honed their systems 
analysis skills at the RAND Corporation in the 1950s and had experience applying these 
techniques within the DoD environment. These personnel had developed their own 
language, analytical methods and theories for matching capabilities with policy 
objectives for DoD within the PPB system.37 This greatly eased the implementation of 
the PPB system because personnel who understood how to use and manage the system 
existed within the organization. 
The structure of DoD mitigated much of the need for a phased implementation of 
the PPB system. PPB did not require much acceptance of the system at the lower levels 
of DoD. Personnel at the lower levels of DoD are seldom involved in the decision making 
process that chooses among multi-million dollar weapons systems and other high dollar 
procurement items that comprise the majority of the defense budget.38 Therefore, the 
rank and file soldier, sailor or airman’s acceptance of the PPB system was not necessary. 
“McNamara’s analysts at OSD fought budget battles with Generals and Admirals…not 
sergeants.”39 While this did create the need for deep understanding of the PPB system at 
the highest levels of DoD, it reduced the amount of understanding necessary at lower 
levels, and thus, reducing the need for a phased/incremental introduction. 
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Four factors explain DoD’s successful implementation of PPB: 
• It possessed a Secretary of Defense in Robert McNamara who understood 
and supported the PPB System. 
• PPB was tailor-made for DoD (as it was the first agency to adopt the 
system) and DoD believed that PPB could benefit the organization. 
• DoD had personnel trained and experienced in disciplines necessary to 
perform and analyze the technical and analytical functions PPB required. 
• DoD did not introduce PPB incrementally but was structured in a way that 
mitigated the need for an incremental roll-out of the system.40 
While existence of these success factors did not ensure the successful 
implementation of PPB within DoD, their presence did increase chances for success and 
helped deter potential problems that could have impeded the introduction of this type of 
system. The implementation of PPB was not so successful or long lived in the other 
federal agencies outside of DoD. These organizations did not have enough of a 
combination of the four success factors to allow PPB to gain traction and be implemented 
in a manner that worked for each individual agency. To clarify further the reasons PPB 
failed as the singular federal budgeting system, the next section describes those agencies 
where PPB failed in the context of the four DoD success factors. 
The agencies where PPB failed (all of the federal government agencies sans DoD) 
were domestic agencies with much of their efforts centered around the management of 
social issues. These are different organizations other than DoD with fundamentally 
different missions. Many of the reasons that PPB was successfully implemented in DoD 
are the same reasons that the PPB system failed as a budgeting system for the other 
domestic agencies.  
None of the non-DoD federal agencies had a top leader who had near the level of 
understanding of program budgeting as Robert McNamara. Most agencies had few if any 
leaders who had ever come in contact with the concept of program budgeting. It was a 
foreign concept. Thus, many of the top leaders within non-DoD agencies were unable to 
                                                 
40 James E. Frank, “A Framework for PPB Success and Causality,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 
Vol. 18, No. 4, (December 1973): 540.  
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understand PPB the system much less use the analytical tools provided by PPB.41 Since 
direction in any organization generally comes from the top, it is nearly impossible to 
implement a system not understood by the leadership. The lack of top-down support for 
implementation created confusion and frustration at the lower levels.  
Program budgeting had worked successfully as a budgeting system for DoD for 
several years before its installation as the budgeting system for all federal agencies. Also, 
because of its success at DoD, the PPB system was taken as an “off the shelf one-size-
fits-all” budgeting system for the entire federal government. Insufficient attention was 
paid to the fact that rather than the large dollar acquisition programs that are ubiquitous in 
DoD and ideally suited for program budgeting, most non-DoD agencies deal with a larger 
number of smaller dollar amount domestic and social programs.42 Additionally, the 
pervasive “plan for everything at all levels” environment that was inherent to DoD and 
aided the transition to program budgeting was not as common in other agencies. Both of 
these factors were ignored when PPB was mandated across all federal agencies. 
Therefore, these agencies found themselves saddled with an alien budgeting system that 
did not match the needs and capabilities of their organizations.43 Besides the immediate 
mismatch of system to agency, the benefits of adopting the PPB system were also 
unidentifiable to the agencies; the availability of federal funds decreased after the roll-out 
of the PPB system because of the new level of scrutiny required by program budgeting.44 
This provided the agencies with less reward for adopting PPB and effectively translating 
programs into policy objectives. Therefore, ultimately, many agencies adopted a 
viewpoint that there was little incentive to work hard in adopting a system that was not 
designed to mesh with their objectives or deal with the issues affecting their 
organizations. 
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One of the most glaring problems with installing PPB across the federal agencies 
was that few possessed the expertise and experience to run the mechanisms of program 
budgeting. The non-DoD agencies lacked personnel who understood policy analysis, who 
were capable of creating valid policy objectives and then performing the analytical 
functions to choose the programs that met these objectives. These agencies lacked the 
applicable theories, language, and experience to formulate the objectives and 
corresponding programs necessary to deal with the social issues facing their 
organizations.45 Additionally, many agencies lacked the proper data systems and the 
personnel capable of managing the data systems required to produce accurate work and 
cost reporting; systems that should have been present and functioning from the previous 
performance budgeting push.46 Without these systems properly functioning and a lack of 
personnel with knowledge in performing the operations of program budgeting, non-DoD 
agencies found themselves awash in data with no ability to turn the data into useful 
information. These agencies were ultimately unable to perform the critical PPB function 
of “linking actions with impacts.”47 Without the ability to link actions to impacts, there is 
no program budgeting and there is no basis for being able to choose the best and most 
efficient programs capable of satisfying objectives. 
For the government-wide installation of the PPB system, an all-at-once 
implementation was chosen. Little attention was paid to the problems associated with 
implementing the system in this manner. An instantaneous capability to perform 
analytical exercises such as analysis of alternatives and cost benefit analysis was 
expected by PPB’s installers merely because the systems implementation had been 
ordered.48 In addition to technical factors, little attention was paid to the fact that, unlike 
DoD, a system such as PPB would permeate much lower levels of many of the other 
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federal agencies.49 Program decisions within DoD are made at the highest levels of the 
organization with members at the lowest levels having little knowledge or input into the 
programs. Non-DoD agencies deal with social issues, and therefore, have personnel at all 
levels who are experienced, know what programs will work effectively for the agency 
and will disagree with programs they do not favor. This deeper penetration of the PPB 
system into the non-DoD agencies along with the lack of attention paid to technical 
factors created resistance towards adoption of the system. Both these factors could have 
been further mitigated with an incremental installation of the PPB system. Installing the 
system in phases, rather than all at once, would have allowed more time to develop the 
technical capacities required by the system and allowed lower level personnel to become 
more comfortable with the system. An incremental implementation would also have 
allowed the non-DoD agencies to determine where and if program budgeting worked 
within their organizations and also to tailor the system to meet the needs of their 
agencies. 
D.  CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided an overview of the current theoretical purpose and 
processes of PPBE, a look at the PPB success factors that aided DoD’s implementation of 
the system, and a description of the federal agencies where PPB failed in relation to 
DoD’s success factors. PPB, through thorough planning and analysis, is designed to 
provide the best and most efficient combination of programs that fit within budget 
constraints and satisfy the nation’s national security objectives. This form of budgeting, 
program budgeting, was successfully introduced into DoD in the 1960’s. PPB was 
successfully implemented in DoD because DoD was commanded by a strong leader who 
understood and supported PPB; the PPB system was specifically tailored for use within 
DoD; agency personnel had the experience and expertise necessary to use and manage 
the system; and the structure of DoD mitigated the need for an incremental installation of 
the system. The agencies where PPB failed lacked enough of a combination of these four  
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factors to allow a successful implementation of the PPB system. With PPB theory and the 
history of program budgeting covered, the next chapter provides a description of normal 
baseline and supplemental methods for funding DoD. 
 
 23
III. FUNDING POST 9/11 GWOT 
This chapter discusses the formal budget process used by the Department of 
Defense (DoD) and Congress to authorize and appropriate federal spending. Both the 
annual and supplemental budget processes are covered examining the differences 
between the two. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the supplemental practices 
used in DoD since 9/11. 
A.   ANNUAL BUDGET PROCESS 
Under the Constitution, Congress is responsible for developing and supporting the 
Armed Forces of the United States. The Congress accomplishes this requirement by 
evaluating and enacting annual defense budgets. Programs created and sustained through 
the defense budget directly influence the capability of the U.S. Armed Forces to defend 
the country and protect national interests. The annual defense budget process involves 
three main phases: formulation of the defense budget request by the executive branch, 
congressional consideration of the proposed budget request, and execution of the budget 
by DoD after budget authority has been granted by Congress.50 
1.  Formulation 
The defense annual budget process begins with the annual budget request through 
the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The budget request for the 
subsequent fiscal year is formally submitted to Congress by the President no later than 
the first Monday in February of the current fiscal year. The formal process used by DoD 
for the formulation of the annual budget is the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 
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defense budget for submission to Congress but is also the principal instrument through 
which DoD organizes its own internal, long-term financial plan for allocation of defense 
resources.51 The PPBE process was examined and discussed in Chapter II. 
2.  Congressional Process 
The next phase in the annual budget process involves congressional action on the 
proposed defense budget and consists of three actions. The first formal action is the 
development of the Concurrent Budget Resolution (CBR). The Congressional Budget Act 
of 1974 mandated the budget resolution as a means for congress to establish the overall 
national budget priorities. The budget resolution sets minimum and maximum funding 
levels on the amount of total budget authority and expenditures. It also allocates spending 
levels among different functional areas such as the national defense budget.52 In addition, 
the Concurrent Budget Resolution establishes separate target amounts for discretionary 
and mandatory spending. Discretionary funds must be appropriated on an annual basis, 
whereas mandatory spending, also known as direct, is dictated by law. Medicare and 
Social Security are examples of mandatory spending programs. Therefore, mandatory 
funding may only be adjusted if Congress amends the associated statutes.53  
Within six weeks after the President has submitted the defense budget request, the 
House and Senate defense authorization and appropriation committees submit their 
opinions and estimates to the budget committees. The Senate Budget Committee is 
expected to report its form of the budget resolution by April 1. Congress is to finalize 
action on the budget resolution by April 15th; however, history has revealed that these 
schedules often slide and there have been times when Congress did not pass a concurrent 
budget resolution at all.54 It is important to be aware that the annual budget resolution 
merely determines overall targets for the defense budget authority and outlays; the 
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resolution does not indicate how the funds should be distributed to the specific defense 
programs. Critical decisions regarding the funding priorities for defense programs are 
decided in the defense authorization and appropriation bills. 
The second formal action in the congressional defense budget process is the 
authorizing legislation. Authorization laws establish, continue, or modify defense 
programs and are required for Congress to appropriate funds to the designated programs. 
Authorization acts identify the scope of the programs and authorize funding levels to 
implement the programs successfully.55 The authorization process does not provide 
budget authority for the defined programs. Rather, budget authority is created through the 
appropriation acts. 
The House and Senate Armed Services Committees are responsible for reporting 
defense authorization legislation to Congress. Defense authorization bills are drafted in 
each committee; differences between the House and Senate versions of the bill are 
resolved in conference committees. The results are then returned to each chamber for 
final passage and the approved legislation is forwarded to the President for approval or 
veto. DoD is prohibited from spending money on new or existing programs without 
authorization.56 There are no laws governing the timeline for action on authorization acts 
and defense authorization bills have been delayed at times past the beginning of the new 
fiscal year.  
The third formal action in the congressional defense budget process is 
appropriation, which provides budget authority to fund the defense programs. Congress 
enacts 13 regular appropriation bills annually that are drafted by the House and the 
Senate Appropriation Committees. The majority of funding for the DoD is provided in 
the defense appropriation bill and the military construction bill.57  
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Historically, the defense appropriation bill has been the last bill to be considered, 
and at times, the approval was delayed beyond the beginning of the new fiscal year. 
When this situation occurs, a Continuing Resolution Appropriation (CRA) is enacted by 
Congress to provide budget authority until the defense appropriation bill is approved. 
Restrictions normally apply to the enactment of a CRA, which may include specified 
time periods and funding levels of current programs at prior fiscal year limits.58 It is 
worthwhile to note that considering the defense appropriation bill last prior to the end of 
the fiscal year has been reversed in the past few years. Possibly, due to national security 
issues and public awareness, the defense appropriation bill has recently become the first 
bill considered in Congress. 
3.  Budget Execution 
The third phase of the annual budget process is budget execution, which begins 
with the Department of Treasury authorizing federal agencies to draw funds from an 
account established by an appropriation. This process allows the budget authority for an 
appropriation to be available for obligation for the purposes outlined in the legislation. 
Spending of allocated funds is closely monitored by DoD budgeting staffs, comparing 
actual spending rates to the projected rates throughout the fiscal year59. Circumstances do 
exist where funds may be reprogrammed or transferred to other accounts or programs. 
For example, pay raises may not be fully funded in the defense appropriations bill and 
money must be reprogrammed from other accounts to meet payroll requirements. Also, 
procurement, medical, or other operating costs grow beyond planned levels and 
additional funds are needed. Under these conditions, procedures are formulated between 
congressional committees and executive branch agencies and funds can be obligated for  
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purposes other than those previously approved.60 The budget execution phase is primarily 
a management process where DoD obligates and expends funds in accordance with 
program goals and objectives. 
Figure 6 depicts the annual defense appropriation process from introduction of the 






































































































Figure 6.   The Defense Budget Process61 
B. SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION PROCESS 
Supplemental appropriations provide additional funding to government programs 
in the current fiscal year, usually for national military contingencies or natural disaster 
emergencies. Such spending cannot always be anticipated and included in the annual 
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budget process since the need for emergency funding tends to arise quickly and is not 
easily forecasted.62 In recent years, however, supplemental appropriations have been the 
primary mechanism for DoD to fund military contingencies in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
The executive branch of the government typically determines the timing and size 
of the supplemental appropriation request submitted to Congress; however, supplemental 
appropriations can be initiated by Congress. Defense supplementals are commonly 
valued with precise amounts, whereas natural disaster supplementals have a tendency to 
be an aggregated estimate.63 Supplemental requests may be proposed prior to, with, or 
subsequent to the transmittal of the annual budget document. Supplemental requests that 
are known at the time of the annual budget submission are generally submitted to 
Congress with the annual budget request rather than later as a separate request.64 In 
addition, supplemental requests must include the specific date when funds are required 
for obligation, a statement of actual and estimated costs for the year prepared in a 
quarterly report, and a statement of actual obligations by month for the previous three 
months.65  
Most wartime defense supplemental requests contain an emergency designation. 
By law, the emergency designation allows the discretionary spending caps to be raised 
for the associated budget authority and outlays. The term “emergency” is not formally 
defined in budget law and has become a source of controversy and contention.66 In 1991, 
OMB attempted to define an “emergency requirement”. A thorough discussion and 
examination of this issue was presented by Amanda Evans.67 Additionally, the 
emergency designation procedure adopted by the President and Congress has resulted in 
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combining emergency spending costs in regular appropriation bills and non-emergency 
spending costs in supplemental bills.68 This action has complicated and blurred the line, 
which separates unanticipated war costs from daily operation and supports costs. 
Supplemental appropriations follow the same path through Congress as annual budgets. 
The supplemental process usually occurs at a much more rapid pace, however, due to the 
emergency designation associated with the request and because only the appropriation 
committees act on it. In addition, the authorization process is not required, which results 
in a faster approval time period.  
History has revealed that wars require supplemental appropriations. Defense Aid 
Supplemental Appropriation Acts funded World War II from 1941 – 1945, with the 
exception of 1944.69 President Franklin Roosevelt believed the government had relied too 
heavily on borrowing to finance World War I, which led to a high rate of inflation. As a 
result, President Roosevelt mobilized immense amounts of financial resources through 
increased taxation and the selling of government bonds. He was determined to ensure the 
higher tax burden was shared equally among the American people and repeatedly 
advocated the need for shared sacrifice to fund the war with financing within U.S. 
boundaries.70 
Subsequent to the outbreak of war in Korea, Congress approved supplemental 
appropriations for the Department of Defense in FY1951. These funds covered the costs 
of operations in Korea, as well as a general world-wide increase of military forces. 
However, this necessity proved to be short-lived and by FY1953 Congress provided all 
funding for military operations in Korea through the annual appropriation process.71 
During this period of time, President Truman and the House of Representatives increased 
corporate and individual income taxes and pushed Congress for spending cuts in 
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nonessential civilian programs.72 These provisions, once again, were the means by which 
the U.S. funded the war until the costs were integrated into the annual appropriation 
process. 
The era of the Vietnam War was filled with controversial and fiercely debated 
issues regarding how to fund the war efforts. Many of the same disputes concerning 
annual versus supplemental war funding aid, which are argued today, began during the 
Vietnam era.73 Supplemental appropriations were used from FY1965 through FY1969 
when war costs exceeded the initial funding estimates. Yet again, the American people 
were involved in financing the Vietnam War through increased taxes. Additionally, 
President Johnson was eventually forced to abandon his Great Society social agenda in 
order to compensate for rising war costs. From FY1970 through the end of the war, 
funding was provided in regular annual appropriation bills.74 The budgeting strategy 
employed by the Johnson and Nixon administrations lend credence to the ability of war 
costs to be incorporated in annual baseline appropriations after the initial onset of war. 
Also, war costs were eventually funded through annual appropriations despite the fact 
that military troop levels were fluctuating and the duration of the conflict was 
unknown.75 
Supplemental appropriations initially funded Operations Desert Storm and Desert 
Shield in 1991 - 1992. Eventually, the U.S. recovered most of the additional costs of 
those operations through contributions from allied nations.76 Costs declined dramatically 
after combat operations were over; therefore, additional funding was not necessary in 
annual or supplemental appropriation bills.77 Defense supplemental appropriations did 
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not acquire a prominent position again until the end of the decade with funding for peace-
keeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo. Partial costs for these contingencies were 
submitted in the annual budget and others were funded in emergency supplemental 
appropriations for FY2000 and 2001. Beginning in FY2002, defense support for these 
operations was directly appropriated into the annual baseline appropriation as military 
troop levels maintained a steady pace.78 
Supplemental appropriations possess symbolic worth in both defense and disaster 
aid as evident after the terrorist’s attacks on September 11, 2001. The American people 
expected their government to defend and protect them; as a result, a $40 billion 
supplemental for aid in the World Trade Center disaster was passed in four days.79  
C. DIFFERENCES – ANNUAL AND SUPPLEMENTAL 
Several differences exist between the annual and supplemental appropriation 
processes. Supplementals, with an emergency designation, do not contain spending caps 
to restrict funding limits. This exception causes emergency spending to appear as 
somewhat “free” even though it still affects the budget deficit or surplus as with annual 
appropriations.80 
Additionally, supplemental appropriations are usually passed very rapidly 
compared to the time-consuming and extensive process involved with passing annual 
baseline appropriations. During the period of 1974 through 1999, 61 supplemental 
appropriation bills were passed: 50.8% were requested, passed, and signed into law 
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months. These time periods may not appear to be very short but the passage of annual 
appropriation bills often extend 10 months from introduction to passage, and sometimes 
longer.81 
Another difference between annual and supplemental appropriations is the 
amount. In some cases, such as natural disasters, the new spending authority in the 
supplemental request may be offset by rescissions, or cancellation of budget authority, to 
other programs. However, defense supplemental requests and appropriations for GWOT 
since 2002 have amounted to significant net gains in each succeeding year. Also, 
supplemental defense appropriations tend to fund 100% of the need or requirement 
whereas annual appropriations are often funded at less than the full level request.82 
Introduction and passage of supplemental appropriations clearly have a seasonal 
distribution. In most years, Congress initiates and approves supplemental appropriations 
during a four-month period in late winter and spring.83 From 1974 through 1999, 38 of 
the 61 supplemental appropriations passed during this time period were initiated in June 
(15) and July (15). The remaining eight were initiated between August and January.84 In 
addition, a look at the timing of supplemental requests to finance the cost of the Iraq War 
indicates that they were delayed in order to not be considered during the deliberations of 
annual appropriations. In February 2005, the president submitted his budget request for 
2006 and only one week later requested an $82 billion supplemental for Afghanistan and 
Iraq.85 Likewise, the president submitted his budget request for FY2007 in early February 
2006, and 86 then on February 16, 2006, he requested a $72.4 billion supplemental to 
fund the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
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In summary, apparent characteristics distinguish supplemental appropriations 
from annual baseline appropriations. First, supplementals with an emergency designation, 
are not restricted to the spending caps normally associated with annual appropriations. 
Second, supplementals are generally passed quickly. Third, supplemental packages may 
result in a net decrease due to certain offsets and usually fund 100% of the need. This is 
different from the funding amounts and levels associated with annual appropriations. 
Finally, supplementals have a distinct seasonal distribution compared to the structured 
schedule to which the annual appropriation process adheres. 
D. GWOT SUPPLEMENTALS 
As established earlier for the past 50 years, wartime supplementals were used 
historically to fund military contingency operations until they could be included into the 
baseline budget. Typically, this shift of funding occurs within the first two years of a 
conflict. However, GWOT funding has not followed the historical trend; supplemental 
appropriations are still being used as the primary funding mechanism six years after the 
start of hostilities. In fact, since the start of GWOT, supplemental appropriations have 
been the primary source of GWOT funding. Figure 7 depicts this fact. 
  FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 
Regular DoD 
Appropriationsa 7.1 -3.5 27.1 50.8 70.5 
GWOT 
Supplementals 62.6 64.9 75.9 66.0 94.5 
Other 10.0 0 0 0 0 
Totals 79.7 61.4 103.0 116.8 165.0 
Supplementals as a 
% of Entire DoD 
GWOT Budget 79% 106% 74% 57% 57% 
aFY2003 Appropriations Act included $7.1B in regular FY2003 defense 
appropriations for GWOT that DoD did not track; the FY2004 DoD 
Appropriations Act rescinded $3.5B in FY2003 war monies. 
Figure 7.   Budget Authority for GWOT Operations87 
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All of the GWOT funding included in Figure 7 and the GWOT funding included 
in the annual appropriations bills is funding that has fallen outside of the PPBE process 
and the multiple layers of vetting that occur during the process.  
In addition to the extended timeline on continuing supplemental funding of 
GWOT, another deviation has occurred where the historical line separating baseline from 
supplemental items has become blurred. According to a professional staff member of the 
House Appropriations Committee on Defense: 
Initial supplemental funding for GWOT was used to fund the added cost 
of deploying troops into theater and redeploying them back home. Within 
the next year, supplemental war funding was expanded to include the costs 
of ammunition and ordnance. Eventually a cascading effect occurred; 
procurement items received inclusion in the supplementals because of the 
added wear and tear the equipment was receiving in theater. Time for 
delivery on procurement items became a sort of informal litmus test for 
inclusion in GWOT supplemental funding; if an item could be fielded 
within 24 months it was okay for inclusion in the supplemental. The most 
recent iteration of new supplemental items is Research and Development 
(R&D); the services have tried to tie some modernization items to 
supplemental funding. 
These expanded guidelines for supplemental war funding have allowed inclusion 
of items that would not have been considered emergent requirements for contingency 
operations in past conflicts. This has allowed large ticket procurement type items, which 
have lengthy life cycles and large operating and support costs, to be funded outside the 
planning and allocation framework of the PPBE process. 
Further clouding the issue of GWOT Supplementals is the manner in which they 
were submitted from FY2001 until the FY2009 President’s Budget Submission. 
According to an Army SES who works on the supplemental process:  
Until FY2008, GWOT supplemental requests were submitted to OSD in 
spreadsheet format with power point presentations included. OSD in turn 
briefed these power point presentations on Capitol Hill and we (the 
services) responded to the necessary committees’ questions. And we got it 
in law pretty much the way we briefed it. This process changed when the 
FY2008 GWOT supplemental request was submitted concurrently with 
the FY2009 President’s Budget and included full budget exhibits. 
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Despite the fact that the FY2008 GWOT supplemental was submitted alongside 
the President’s budget and was in full budget exhibit format, the trend of enormous 
GWOT supplementals remains intact for FY2008. A total of $189.3B in emergency 
FY2008 supplemental appropriations has been requested for DoD. Through December 
2007, Congress had approved $86.8B which leaves $102.5B still pending.88 Again, these 
funds are not part of the baseline budget process. Therefore, this creates the illusion that 
DoD is operating within normal budget parameters.  
E.  CONCLUSION 
Chapter II discussed the checks and balances in the PPBE process to match 
programs to policy objectives. Chapter III discussed the mechanisms for funding DoD 
through annual appropriations, supplemental appropriations, how wars were funded 
historically, and how GWOT has been funded since 9/11. Six years after its inception, 
GWOT continues to be funded by emergency supplemental appropriations. The line 
separating baseline and supplemental line items has been blurred to include Research and 
Development (R&D) and procurement; items that traditionally have not been allowed in 
supplemental war funding. Despite attempts to increase the transparency of supplemental 
requests by requiring full budget exhibits and concurrent submission with the President’s 
budget, the trend of large GWOT supplementals persists. With so much DoD funding 
arriving from outside the PPBE process, Chapter IV defines the environment when PPB 
was introduced and of post 9/11, compares the environments, and uses the comparison to 
explain deviations from the PPBE process.     
                                                 
88 Stephen Daggett, Susan B. Epstein, Rhoda Margesson, Curt Tarnoff, Pat Towell, and Catherine 
Dale, “Second FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations for Military Operations, International Affairs, and 
Other Purposes,” CRS Report for Congress, (May 8, 2008), 9-12, 
http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34451.pdf (accessed May 24, 2008).  
 36
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 37
IV. ANALYSIS 
The PESTEL Analysis is a tool most often used in defining an industry in which a 
business operates.  The PESTEL Analysis has no known creator but is an offshoot of the 
more commonly known PEST (Political, Economic, Socio-cultural, Technological) and 
SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analyses.89  Although most 
commonly used in the private sector, the PESTEL framework can be used as a method 
for identifying and organizing the issues that affect many different types of industries.90  
Once completed, the PESTEL framework provides a “picture” of the environment in 
which the associated business, institution…etc., operates.  
Chapter IV performs a PESTEL analysis to define the external influences that 
affected the environment in which the initial PPB process was implemented.  With the 
initial environment established, a PESTEL analysis of the post 9/11 era is employed to 
define the dynamic environment in which the PPBE system currently operates.  This 
analysis will be the catalyst for determining the reasons for deviation from the PPBE 
System.  The chapter concludes with the discussion of environmental factors that 
contributed to the result of funding GWOT outside of PPBE. 
A. PESTEL ANALYSIS OF THE 1960/1970 ERA 
The PESTEL framework utilizes six categories in organizing the factors that 
shape an environment: political, economic, socio-cultural, technological, ecological and 
legal.  The political category contains policy, domestic, and foreign issues that 
significantly contribute to shaping the environment.  Economic factors include such items 
as interest rates, inflation, the stock and real estate markets.  Demographic shifts, public 
opinion, lifestyles and tastes are all factors present in the socio-cultural category.  The 
technological category includes advancements in such areas as products, processes,  
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services and thinking.  Environmental factors such as temperature trends, pollution and 
acts of nature constitute the ecological category.  The legal category contains legislation 
and litigation that affect the environment being defined.  
1. DoD Environment: 1960s/1970s 
The following PESTEL analysis focuses on factors that impacted the environment 
which led to the implementation of the PPB System.  The two decades of the 1960’s and 
1970’s were chosen to describe the environments thoroughly that existed immediately 
before and after PPB’s implementation.  Previous PESTEL analyses of this era were not 
found.  It was, therefore, necessary to perform a PESTEL analysis by reviewing 
significant events that occurred during the 1960’s and 1970’s to include those that in the 
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Figure 8.   1960’s/70’s PESTEL Diagram 
2. Political 
The political environment surrounding the 1960 – 1970 era encompassed the 
Vietnam War from 1963 – 1975, the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963, the 
Great Society reform initiatives and the Watergate scandal that began in 1972. 
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The Vietnam War was a conflict between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
and the United States, which supported the Republic of Vietnam.  The Kennedy 
administration had recently overcome the failure of the invasion at the Bay of Pigs and 
the creation of the Berlin Wall.  Therefore, Kennedy reasoned that the inability of the 
United States to acquire control over the spread of communism would negatively reflect 
upon his reputation and the credibility of the United States.91  As tension in the war zone 
heightened, policy-makers in Washington began to deduce that the Republic of Vietnam 
was becoming politically unstable and military intervention was inevitable.  Kennedy 
ultimately formed the U.S. – South Vietnamese Air Force, which included American 
pilots and increased the number of military advisors to address the rise in guerrilla 
activity.  However, on November 22, 1963, John F. Kennedy was assassinated and 
succeeded by Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson.  President Johnson upheld the U.S. 
support of the Republic of Vietnam but Johnson was more absorbed in his domestic 
reform initiatives and did not consider the Vietnam War a priority.92  The conflict 
escalated and continued until April 30, 1975 when North Vietnam captured the capital of 
South Vietnam, Saigon.  Effectively, this event ended the Vietnam War, which resulted 
in a defeat for the United States and the Republic of Vietnam.   
In addition to the end of the Vietnam War, a series of political scandals 
surrounding President Richard Nixon permeated the political environment.  The 
Watergate scandal exposed numerous illegal activities sanctioned and conducted by 
President Nixon’s administration.  Some of these activities included campaign fraud, 
unauthorized political surveillance, illicit wiretapping, and a secret monetary fund, which 
financed these overt operations.93  Ultimately, the discovery of these crimes led to the 
resignation of President Nixon on August 9, 1974. 
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As mentioned earlier in the discussion of the Vietnam War, President Johnson 
introduced a series of domestic programs known as the Great Society during this period.  
The objective of these social reforms focused on the elimination of poverty and racial 
injustice.  Consequently, major spending in these programs addressed education, medical 
care, urban issues, and transportation.  Medicare, Medicaid, and federal education 
funding are programs that originated from this social reform initiative and are still in 
existence today.94 
This era was filled with volatility as the Vietnam War and Watergate scandal 
pervaded the political environment.  The increased anti-war sentiment among the 
American public fueled their distaste of the federal government.  In addition, the financial 
burden of the Vietnam War resulted in budget cuts from the Great Society programs 
introduced by President Johnson.  Increased spending between 1965 and 1973 to fund the 
military operations in Vietnam caused the federal government to operate with a large 
budget deficit.95 
3. Economic 
Several factors significantly influenced the economic environment during the 
1960s and 1970s such as productivity growth, the 1973 oil crisis, stagflation, and the 
removal of the U.S. dollar from the gold standard.   
The 1960’s consisted of escalated growth in the U.S. economy and the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).  President John F. Kennedy authorized the largest tax reduction 
in U.S. history when he took office in 1961.  The G.I. Bill provided a better educated 
labor market.  By the end of this decade, productivity growth had reached a maximum 
growth rate much like the one reached earlier in the decade but this state would not 
remain.   
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Another factor that affected the economic environment of this era was the 1973 
oil crisis instigated by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).  
In October 1973, OPEC placed an embargo on oil shipments to the United States.  In 
turn, the American public was immediately faced with extreme increases to oil and gas 
prices and the U.S. underwent the first fuel shortage since World War II.96  By the early 
1970’s, stagflation had infused the U.S. economy with uncontrollable price inflation, 
increased unemployment, and decelerating economic growth.  In response to this 
economic condition, President Richard Nixon instituted income policies regarding wage 
and price controls.97  However, they were discontinued when it was determined that this 
effort did not have a substantial affect on inflation.   
Furthermore, in 1971, President Nixon removed the U.S. dollar from the 
international gold standard.  Under the gold standard, the U.S. banking system protected 
the economy’s stability and growth.  Elimination of the gold standard made it impossible 
to protect financial savings from confiscation through inflation. 
The economic environment of this time began with escalated productivity growth 
but ended with a period of high inflation and high unemployment known as stagflation.  
The American public was faced with the oil crisis in 1973, which contributed to an 
atmosphere of anxiety and unrest.  Additionally, the troubled years of 1973 – 1974 were 
characterized as the worst in the stock market since the Great Depression. 
4. Socio-Cultural 
The socio-cultural environment of the 1960’s was marked by radical change and 
evolutionary modes of thinking.  As children from the post-war baby boom matured into 
young adults, they began to gravitate away from the idealistic and conservative mindset 
of the 1950’s.  The Civil Rights Movement, liberalism, and the pressure from the anti-
war activists led to immense social and cultural change throughout the United States. 
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The African-American civil rights movement of this era was not only directed at 
abolishing racial discrimination but included economic and political freedom from the 
dominating white population.  Boycott efforts were responsible for the eventual 
desegregation of buses in the United States.  The march on Washington in 1963 led by 
Martin Luther King clearly had a significant impact on the passage of the civil rights law 
that the Kennedy administration proposed.  Additionally, numerous race riots took place 
during this volatile period of social unrest in major cities across the nation further 
escalating the disparity between the races.98 
The liberal ideology of this era fueled the growth in modern feminism regarding 
lifestyle and economic issues.  Agendas focusing on equality in the workplace and 
domestic violence became pivotal objectives.  Moreover, a substantial movement of 
resistance to the Vietnam War gained momentum as opposition to the military conflict 
intensified.  The social and cultural changes that evolved during this era affected all 
aspects of life to include laws, education, values, and lifestyles. 
5. Technological 
A new era of innovation and progress pervaded the technological environment 
during the 1960’s and 1970’s with the beginning of the information and computer age, 
the space race, and the development of the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network 
(ARPANET).   
The United States and the Soviet Union began to engage in a competition of space 
exploration known as the Space Race.  In response, President Kennedy announced 
Project Apollo in 1961, which consisted of a series of exploration flights in space.  The 
Americans and Soviets were then embroiled in a race to put a man on the moon.  In 1969, 
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advance in their respective space programs, and in 1975, a Soviet spacecraft docked in 
space with the U.S. Apollo.  This event virtually ended the rivalry of the Space Race 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.99 
Another area of technological innovation during this era was the development of 
the first operational packet-switching network, which eventually evolved into the global 
internet known today.  The Department of Defense created the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (ARPA) to develop advancing capabilities that would enable the U.S. to 
expand the frontiers of technology.  In 1962, ARPA launched a computer research 
program to design and develop the technology of computer networking.  Ultimately, this 
research program conceived the computer networking system known as the ARPANET, 
and in December 1971, this network successfully linked 23 host computers to each other.  
This innovation became the basis for future data and voice communication worldwide.100 
The technological environment of the 1960s and 1970s was characterized by new 
innovations in the computer industry as well as the space program.  The computer 
technologies developed during this era formed the foundation for data and 
telecommunication transmissions utilized today. 
6. Ecological 
Rising ecological awareness during the 1960’s and 1970’s led to pollution 
regulation in the industrial economies as well as the quest for alternative energy 
solutions.  The American public was becoming acutely perceptive to threats surrounding 
the ecosystem of the nation.  Population explosion, industrial expansion, and growth in 
automotive commerce in the 1960’s were producing mass amounts of product waste.  As 
a result, water channels and waste disposal sites were riddled with disease-infested 
garbage.  Industrial wastes produced acidic smog and automobile emissions contributed 
to the erosion of the ecosystem.  These conditions permeated the environment into the 
1970’s as waste output increased across the nation.  The establishment of the 
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970 by President Nixon indicated the 
acknowledgment by the federal government of the harm and degradation that the 
ecosystem had endured.  The EPA was responsible for enforcing environmental laws in 
addition to conducting environmental assessments and research. 
During this era, the American public became acutely aware of pollution effects 
and industrial waste on the ecological environment.  Industrial sewage, automobile 
emissions and new synthetic materials contributed to the erosion of the ecosystem.  
7. Legal 
Significant events that occurred during the 1960’s helped contribute to the legal 
environment and enactment of federal laws during that era.  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
was a historic piece of legislation, which prohibited segregation in schools and public 
places.  Following this revolutionary governmental decision was the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, which aimed to eliminate previous legal tactics that prevented blacks and 
minorities from voting.  The Social Security Act of 1965 resulted from social reform 
initiatives introduced by President Johnson.  This portion of legislation authorized 
Medicare and provided federal funding for many of the medical costs that older 
Americans were facing.  
In 1966, the Medicaid program was instituted through Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act.  Furthermore, this era was a pivotal turning point in federal regulatory 
policy regarding the ecological environment.  The Clear Air Act of 1963 set emission 
standards for industrial sites followed by amendments in later years, which set regulatory 
standards for auto emissions.  Also, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 was 
passed and required the federal government to consider the environmental impacts related 
to potential projects such as building a highway. 
The legal enactments detailed above resulted from issues that existed in many of 
the PESTEL categories during this time, including initiatives introduced by President 
Johnson in the Great Society program.  Furthermore, federal regulatory policies were 
established to reduce the threat on the ecological environment. 
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B.    PESTEL ANALYSIS OF THE POST 9/11 ENVIRONMENT 
The following PESTEL analysis describes the environment that PPBE has 
operated in since September 11, 2001.  Again, a previous PESTEL analysis of this era 
was not found.  This PESTEL analysis was created by reviewing significant events that 
have occurred since 9/11 and includes those that in the opinions of the authors aided in 
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Figure 9.   Post 9/11 PESTEL Diagram 
1. Political 
The Executive Branch of the Government has remained fairly stable throughout 
the post 9/11 period.  George Bush has served as President of the United States 
throughout this period; however, he was elected by narrow margins.  Both of these 
election results indicate the country was fairly divided on whom to choose as the 
President.  Additionally, Donald Rumsfeld served as the Secretary of Defense during the 
majority of this period: January 2001 – December 2006. 
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The legislative branch of the government has changed greatly in the post 9/11 
period.  When President Bush entered office in 2000, he inherited a Republican House.  
Between 2000 and 2002, power shifted in the Senate between the two parties four times. 
From 2002 to 2006, the President enjoyed a Republican majority in both chambers of 
Congress.  The 2002 congressional election results indicated that the public believed the 
Republican Party was the most capable of leading the country after the events of 
September 11, 2001.  This sentiment shifted though, as evidenced by the 2006 
congressional election; President Bush inherited a unified Republican government but 
lost that advantage in the 2006 elections. 
External issues have dominated the post 9/11 political environment.  The attacks 
of September 11, 2001 brought the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and the ensuing 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.  This same period has also seen increased 
determination and effort by such countries as Iran and North Korea to gain nuclear 
technology and weaponry.  Instability further escalated in the Middle East with the 
Lebanon War of 2006.  All of these occurrences have played a large role in shaping the 
post 9/11 political environment and have created a feeling that the world is much less 
safer than it was just six years ago. 
Several domestic issues have helped shape the post 9/11 political environment.  
DoD found itself competing harder for scarce resources.  Spending on entitlement 
programs such as social security, Medicare, and Medicaid has risen from 15% in 1966 to 
40% today’s federal budget.101  Border security and immigration policies are a source of 
constant debate and Americans expect these issues to be addressed by the politicians in 
power.102  The fact that the federal budget has operated at a deficit in each of the years 
since 9/11 further complicates this environment with projections of deficit spending 
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increasing to 3.5% of the nation’s gross domestic product by 2014.103  The upward 
pressure on the federal budget in the form of increased spending on new and existing 
programs during a time of increased deficit spending places DoD in further competition 
for resources.     
The post 9/11 political environment, thus far, has seen a relatively stable 
executive branch compared to the reversal of political majorities in the legislative branch.  
External events have shaped this environment and appear to have ushered in a time of 
heightened violence.  Americans no longer feel that that the barrier of safety inside the 
U.S. borders is as high or as wide as it was before 9/11.  In addition, the constituency 
expects the government to provide more and more, and thus, placing further claims on the 
same funding for which DoD competes.           
2. Economic 
The post 9/11 domestic economy could best be described as boom or bust.  The 
tech stock meltdown of 2000 followed by the attacks of 9/11 kept the stock markets 
depressed until 2003.  The stock market began its upturn in 2003 and continued until 
2007.104  During this entire time, interest rates were held at historically low rates, 
providing the cheap money needed to fuel the ensuing housing boom.  Real estate prices 
soared to historic highs until 2006.  At this time, no one is exactly sure of the future 
direction of the housing or stock markets but the general sentiment is negative.  News 
services report daily on speculation of when falling housing prices will level off and 
whether or not a recession looms around the next corner.  The volatility previously 
described has become part of the economic landscape of the post 9/11 environment. 
Unethical corporate leadership played no small role in the bursting of the tech 
bubble in 2000.  The full implications and extent of this behavior was not known until 
well after the collapse.  In 2001, the public became aware of the corruption engaged in by 
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leaders of such companies as Enron, Tyco and WorldCom.  Executives at these 
companies exploited earnings reports and earnings estimates to drive their companies’ 
stock prices even higher.105  Once these reports made it into the public domain, the trust 
that had previously existed between investors and the corporate world disappeared 
instantly. 
In the midst of the boom and bust cycle and the revelations of corporate scandals, 
the emerging markets of the world flourished.  China was finally allowed to enter the 
World Trade Organization.  The economies of China and India have seen unprecedented 
growth.  With their cheap labor and ever increasing middle class, they became economic 
powers and major destinations for commodities and finished goods of all types.  With the 
rise of these nations, the price of oil, steel and other commodities have risen sharply.  The 
U.S. now finds itself in a fiercer and more expensive competition for these resources. 
The economic environment of the post 9/11 is characterized by the boom or bust 
nature of the stock and real estate markets, the distrust created by widespread corporate 
scandals and the increased competition for resources between the U.S. and emerging 
nations.  These are broad factors but represent a portion of the environment in which 
DoD operates.           
3. Socio-cultural 
The socio-cultural factors that emerge as particularly pertinent to the post 9/11 
DoD environment are:  the emergence of non-state actors, waning public support for 
GWOT, domestic terrorism and shifting demographics and expectations. 
The attacks of 9/11 introduced America to a new reality; wars can be waged on a 
nation state by a non-state entity.  Al Qaeda presents a new type of enemy to the U.S.; not 
located in any one country, no set nationality and loose structure made up of many 
independent parts.  This type of enemy represents a major change from traditional 
opponents.  
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Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were widely 
supported in their initial stages.  Support has waned, in particular, for the Iraqi piece of 
GWOT.  Four years into OIF, there are public and Congressional outcries for firm 
withdrawal dates.  GWOT no longer enjoys the widespread support or momentum it 
experienced in 2001-2003. 
Another reported socio-cultural trend is domestic terrorism.  Reports of school, 
mall and church shootings frequent the media channels on a monthly basis.  The 
increased frequency and publication of these types of events lend to the feelings of 
domestic vulnerability created with the attacks of 9/11. 
The last socio-cultural factors to be presented are the shifting demographics of the 
U.S. and the rising expectations of the citizenry.  As the first members of the baby-
boomer generation are set to receive their first social security checks, it is evident that a 
major demographic shift is underway as the percentage of the working population 
decreases.  An unprecedented number of Americans will transition from the workforce to 
retirement or semi-retired status and many will begin collecting social security checks 
and will become eligible for Medicare and Medicaid in the near future.106  This increased 
drain on the social security trust and new entrants to the Medicare system is widely 
publicized and will lead to further increases in entitlement spending.  Also altering the 
demographic makeup of the country is the immigration issue.  Each year, 1.25 million 
immigrants enter the U.S.  Nearly 500,000 of these immigrants enter the country 
illegally.107  Americans are aware of these statistics and expect the issue to be addressed.  
Other events such as Hurricane Katrina highlight the citizenry’s desire for federal 
assistance when tragedy strikes.  The federal government stopped short of an absolute 
bailout of homeowners in the recent (and ongoing) sub-prime crisis of 2007 but the media 
presented many opinions stating that the government should have intervened further. 
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The increased role of non-state actors, the public’s waning support for GWOT, 
the prevalence of domestic terrorism and the demographic and expectation shifts within 
the country are all socio-cultural factors that have greatly affected the post 9/11 
environment.  The U.S. finds itself fighting a war that the public is tired of against an 
enemy who has no boundaries and does not follow any rules.  Furthermore, shaping this 
environment is the public’s desire for government protection against domestic terrorism, 
acts of nature and financial debacles like the sub-prime crisis.      
4. Technological 
The rise in computer information systems and the internet have increased the 
speed at which information moves, the audience it reaches and the number of information 
providers.  Information moves almost instantaneously between points utilizing the 
internet and can be dispersed to an almost infinite number of points within the western 
world.  This makes information increasingly available to the public and open to comment 
and critique.  In addition to the transparency these systems have given to DoD’s 
information, these systems have also enabled non-state actors to obtain a spot on the 
world stage. Technology also permeates the weapons systems the war fighters use to 
perform their jobs.  Weapons systems are increasingly technical and expensive.108   
Unmanned aerial vehicles, laser guided bombs, global positioning systems, and 
various other technically advanced weapon systems all have a place in GWOT.  All come 
with hefty price tags and are necessary expenses in order to keep pace with the dynamic 
war front. 
Another form of technology currently utilized in the DoD environment is the 
adaptation of business practices into the public realm.  Navy personnel are now 
encouraged at the field activity level to do such things as:  think of return on investment 
when making decisions, creating metrics to determine and track readiness, and assigning 
costs to most activities performed.  Many of these practices were introduced through New 
Public Management reform movements in the 1990s in order to modernize the public 
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sector and create policy change.109  The President’s Management Agenda (PMA) 
introduced by George W. Bush in FY2002 was a bold strategy to improve the 
management and performance of the federal government.110  Additionally, the Program 
Assessment Rating Tool (PART) was introduced in July 2002 as a diagnostic method to 
assess the performance of federal programs.  At a macro-level, DoD is required to 
produce financial statements, much like a civilian corporation.  All of these tools 
represent technological advances in DoD which are designed to increase efficiency 
within the organization. 
The post 9/11 environment has been influenced greatly by technology shifts.  
Information moves quickly and moves through the hands of an ever-increasing number of 
people.  Weapons systems are increasingly sophisticated, and as a result, are costlier to 
purchase and maintain.  Furthermore, business practices from the private sector have 
been adapted by DoD and are changing many of DoD’s processes and environment.     
5. Ecological  
In the past six years, global warming has moved from relative obscurity to one of 
the most prevalent social and political issues in the world today.  It is the subject of 
exhaustive debate and has sparked the “green” movement.  Car makers are scrambling to 
produce more hybrid vehicles to satisfy the desires of their “green” conscious consumers.  
Fields of wind turbines dot the landscape of the U.S., converting wind power into 
electricity.  All of this is in an effort to reverse the global warming trend and the chaos 
that would result from increased temperatures and rising seas. 
Fear of global pandemics has also become part of the fabric of the post 9/11 
environment.  SARS, HIV, Avian Bird Flu and Mad Cow Disease are all examples of 
diseases that have caused the collective world to tremble during the past six years.  Due 
to their contagious natures and the large amount of global travel that now occurs, diseases 
such as these represent real threats to the nation’s security.  These threats are further 
                                                 
109 Michael Barzelay, The New Public Management Improving Research and Policy Dialogue, 
(Regents of the University of California, 2001), 157. 
110 Office of Management and Budget, “The President’s Management Agenda FY2002,” 
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget (accessed May 6, 2008). 
 52
made real to the public by the large amounts of media coverage they receive. Natural 
disasters have also become a part of the post 9/11 landscape.  Hurricanes Katrina, Ivan, 
Isabel and Rita were extremely destructive and incurred large costs to the U.S.  Other 
natural disasters such as the Southeast Asia Tsunami and the Kashmir Earthquakes were 
viewed on the worldwide stage.  Many of these events required a direct response by the 
federal government and DoD and all were absorbed into the psyche of the American 
people. 
Fears of a global warming trend, the threat of global pandemics and the high level 
of destruction created by recent natural disasters are ecological factors that have affected 
the post 9/11 environment.  Many of these factors compelled responses on the part of the 
federal government and DoD.  In addition to the action and expense incurred, these 
factors have also exposed many vulnerabilities and the unpredictable nature of the world.  
6. Legal 
Several legal factors have heavily influenced the post 9/11 environment.  These 
include President Bush’s use of signing statements and low number of vetoes, the USA 
Patriot Act was passed in 2001, the U.S. treatment of GWOT prisoners at military prisons 
drew close scrutiny, and the involvement of the government in pursuing the perpetrators 
of the corporate accounting scandals discussed previously in this document. 
The issuance of signing statements has long been a practice by U.S. Presidents.  
Signing statements are generally issued by a President when he signs a bill into law but 
wants to disagree with the constitutional interpretation Congress used in writing the bill.  
President Bush issued signing statements with 150 of the bills he signed in his first six 
years in office.111  The President has also altered the historical use of signing statements 
beyond merely showing support or disagreeing with items within a law and he has used 
signing statements on numerous occasions as a mode to communicate that he will not 
uphold certain sections of laws with which he disagrees.  Some examples of his use of 
signing statements for this purpose include “reporting to Congress pursuant to the Patriot 
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Act, the torture of prisoners, whistle blower protections for the Department of Energy, the 
number of U.S. troops in Columbia, the use of illegally gathered intelligence, and the 
publication of educational data gathered by the Department of Education.”112  The use of 
signing statements in this manner has effectively provided the President with the ability 
of a  line item veto.  This is further evidenced by the fact that the President has only 
vetoed nine bills since entering office.  This use of signing statements has greatly 
increased the power of the Executive Office at the expense of the Legislative Branch.          
The USA Patriot Act, passed in 2001, provided the U.S. government expansive 
flexibility in information gathering techniques to pursue suspected terrorists.  The act, 
which passed easily through congress shortly after the attacks of 9/11, has drawn 
increasing criticism in recent years.  Many citizens and politicians question whether the 
bill goes too far and violates the public’s right to privacy.  This bill has become one of 
the centerpieces of debate in defining the lengths to which government can go in pursuing 
the war on terror.113 
Reports of mistreatment of prisoners at the military holding facility in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and the release of pictures of prisoners being tortured at the Abu 
Ghraib military prison in Iraq have prompted much criticism by human rights groups and 
congressional investigations.  These widely publicized events indicate that the citizenry 
cares how the U.S. treats its enemies and the tactics used to extract information from 
them.  Legal action was eventually taken against key military personnel involved in the 
Abu Ghraib scandal. 
In addition to the action taken against military criminals, government officials 
were very active in pursuing the executives involved in the corporate accounting scandals 
detailed in the economic analysis section of this document.  Executives of companies  
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such as Enron, Tyco and WorldCom were prosecuted and received prison sentences for 
the roles they played in these scandals.114  These proceedings were highly covered by the 
media and met with approval by the general public. 
The factors detailed above portray a legal environment in which increased 
probing by the government into the private lives of its citizens has become increasingly 
questioned.  Additionally, the public expects many of the government functions to be 
more transparent and for criminals of all types (military and otherwise) to be punished for 
the crimes they have committed. 
C.  POST 9/11 CONTRIBUTIONS TO PPBE DEVIATION 
Multiple environmental factors have allowed the deviation from PPBE through 
the continued funding of GWOT by supplemental appropriations.  This combination of 
factors has created a post 9/11 DoD budgeting environment that includes:  a lack of 
checks and balances, adoption of a reactionary budgeting system, a perpetuation of the 
myth that the cost of GWOT is not a financial burden, and continued budgetary pressures 
due to mandatory spending. 
Congressional complicity and the speed of the supplemental process have created 
a lenient system of checks and balances for DoD funding.  The unified government of 
President Bush and the Republican Congressional majorities made securing supplemental 
GWOT funding easy during the first five years of the war.  This complicity continued 
with the Democratic majority of the 110th Congress, however.  President Bush has proven 
capable of obtaining the desired amounts of supplemental GWOT funding through 
Congress by accusing them of placing U.S. troops in jeopardy if a given supplemental is 
not passed expeditiously.  The OMB’s Statement of Administrative Policy dated May 15, 
2008115 provides an example of this regarding the 2008 wartime supplemental bill.  It 
states: 
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The committee-reported bill seeks to tie the hands of our military 
commanders and includes an artificial timeline for withdrawal.  
Precipitous withdrawal from Iraq would embolden our enemies and 
confirm their belief that America will not stand behind its commitments.  
It could lead to a safe haven in Iraq for terrorism that could be used to 
attack America and our interests around the world, and is likely to unleash 
chaos in Iraq that could spread across the region.  Additionally, the 
administration strongly opposes attempts to limit the much needed 
flexibilities of our commanders in the field during this and future conflicts 
by codifying current policy regarding deployment schedules. 
The political factor of a unified government and the socio-cultural factor of fear 
has allowed the President to have Congress fund GWOT outside of the PPBE process.  
Congress has also cooperated in the process because it has secured additional funding for 
its own purposes.  As stated by a senior journalist from the Congressional Research 
Service: 
From the Congress’ point of view, part of the reason I think that 
supplementals continue is it makes things easier for Congress in a lot of 
ways because it’s a vehicle for finding the funds for other stuff, in addition 
to war costs. 
The OMB’s Statement of Administration Policy dated May 20, 2008116 accuses 
Congress of adding another $10B to the President’s original 2008 wartime supplemental 
bill to fund such items as unemployment insurance, Medicare, Medicaid and the 
Emergency Agriculture Relief Act.   
In addition to Congress’s complicity, the speed at which the supplemental funding 
process operates has helped lessen the checks and balances normally associated with 
DoD funding.  As discussed in Chapter III, supplemental appropriations are usually 
passed very quickly compared to the annual baseline appropriation.  Since supplementals 
do not go through the rigors of the PPBE process, they receive less congressional scrutiny 
and oversight.  The shorter and less in-depth process allows DoD to react more quickly in  
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funding emerging GWOT requirements.  This process also moves quickly because 
Congress does not want to project an appearance of not supporting the troops through 
failing to pass wartime supplementals in a timely manner.   
While Congressional complicity and the speed of the supplemental process 
allowed the adoption of a reactionary budgeting system, the desire for timelier 
information and a lack of an effective national security strategy for fighting the insurgent-
type enemy GWOT presents have forced the need for such a reactionary system.  The 
PPBE System is a methodical process with multiple layers; it is not a particularly fast or 
flexible system.  DoD operates in a global environment where information moves almost 
instantaneously between many points.  DoD continues to adopt private sector business 
practices in an attempt to improve the speed and efficiency of processes to match the 
changing information environment.  Additionally, the introduction of uncertainty into the 
DoD budgeting environment has increased the need for timely information leading to 
increased accuracy.  These socio-cultural, technological and economic environmental 
factors have encouraged DoD to create a just-in-time budgeting process (through the 
continued use of supplemental appropriations to fund GWOT) as a means to respond to 
the demand for timelier information. 
Difficulty in developing an effective strategy for fighting GWOT also aided DoD 
in migrating to a reactionary budgeting system.  PPB functioned well at its inception; 
programming was easily tied to the policy objectives that accompanied the national 
defense strategies of containment and mutually assured destruction.  These strategies 
addressed a somewhat predictable enemy, who adhered to borders, wore uniforms, and 
could be counted on to follow at least some of the laws of armed conflict.  The country 
has yet to develop an effective strategy for dealing with the socio-cultural factor of an 
insurgent-type enemy in the post 9/11 environment.  Insurgents do not operate within set 
borders, determining their numbers accurately is difficult, and they are an extremely 
unpredictable foe.  Developing a strategy to deal with the enemy presented by GWOT 




is difficult at best.  The lack of an effective strategy reduces DoD to planning for all 
contingencies and forces the need to deviate from the PPBE process by seeking 
additional budget authority from outside the process. 
Perpetuation of the myth that GWOT is not a financial burden has also 
contributed to the continued deviation from PPBE.  This myth has remained believable 
because the executive and legislative branches of government have effectively navigated 
the political, socio-cultural and legal factors of the post 9/11 environment by separating 
war costs from opportunity costs, down playing the high costs of the war, and separating 
the war cost from the means to pay for it. 
As discussed in Chapter III, previous wars were funded by the citizenry through 
the selling of bonds, higher taxes or social program cuts.  This type of war funding forced 
the nation to choose between war and other uses for the money.  The current use of 
supplementals to fund GWOT has separated war costs from the associated opportunity 
cost; eliminating the need to choose between funding the war and deploying the funding 
for other national desires.  The administration even worked to maintain this separation in 
the supplementals; OMB’s Statement of Administration Policies, dated May 15117 and 
20118, 2008, chastise Congress’ attempts to add domestic spending items to the 2008 
wartime supplemental request.  With a war funded by debt outside the baseline budget 
process, the President and Congress gain a political advantage because they are not 
forced to choose between social programs and war and can avoid the associated questions 
raised by economists. 
The attacks of 9/11 occurred during a period of federal budget surpluses.  Due to 
the feeling of economic security, little attention was paid initially to how to fund the war.  
President Bush encouraged American citizens (and consumers) to return to their normal 
lives and provided assurances that sacrifices by the citizenry would not be necessary.  
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Further clouding the issue of GWOT funding was a low initial war cost estimate of $60B 
and the belief that victory in Iraq would prove quick and decisive.  For these reasons, the 
war was never formally linked to the annual budget process where the budget resolution 
would have reconciled receipts and expenditures.  Once the realization was made that the 
war would not follow the anticipated path and the budget surpluses disappeared, no 
action was taken by the administration to create a long-term war funding solution.  Once 
GWOT was recognized as a “long war,” the administration and Congress should have 
changed the funding mechanism.  The cost of the war and the nation’s inability to afford 
it continue to be downplayed; OMB’s Statement of Administration Policy dated May 15, 
2008119 threatens Presidential veto if the 2008 wartime supplemental bill includes a tax 
increase.   
The continued use of supplementals has allowed a separation of war costs from 
the means to pay for it.  Wartime supplemental appropriations directly affect the deficit; 
however, politicians are able to hide this due to the continued claim that war costs are 
unpredictable.120  The “emergency” name implies they are for an unanticipated expense 
that will not become a regular part of an annual budget.  They are created and passed 
outside the annual budget process and are not confined by spending caps.  These facets of 
supplemental appropriations play on the political, socio-cultural and economic factors 
that exist in the post 9/11 environment to create the illusion that DoD is spending within 
budget constraints.  According to a senior journalist from the Congressional Research 
Service:    
The emergency spending mechanism just allows you more flexibility to 
pretend you’re living within budget limits when you actually don’t want 
to. 
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This is clearly evident as stated by an Army SES who works on the supplemental 
process:   
In the case of the Army, we are practically doubling the size of our budget 
outside of the (PPBE) process.  When the war effort goes away, not all of 
those costs do. 
The funding of the war through debt-backed supplementals allows the U.S. to 
“afford” the war without having to determine how to pay for it. 
The upward trend of entitlement spending is projected to continue.  Increased 
spending in this area applies top down budget pressure on discretionary programs such as 
DoD.  Figure 11 depicts this decrease in federal spending on DoD over time and the 
corresponding increase in social security, Medicare/Medicaid and servicing of the 
national debt.  
 
 
Figure 10.   Composition of Federal Spending121 
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This top down pressure is occurring at the same time that DoD battles increased 
costs to train, maintain and properly equip its forces.  The socio-cultural factors of the 
nation’s demographic shift and entitlement mentality are competing with DoD for their 
share of scarce resources.  DoD has adapted to this increase in competition by securing 
additional funding outside the PPBE process in the form of supplemental appropriations. 
In summary, deviations from the formal PPBE process are the result of the 
combination of numerous factors that comprise the post 9/11 environment.  This 
combination of factors has created a DoD budgeting environment that includes:  a lack of 
checks and balances, adoption of a reactionary budgeting system, a perpetuation of the 
myth that the cost of GWOT is not a financial burden, and continued budgetary pressures 
due to mandatory spending.  The following chapter provides the implications of these 
continued deviations from the formal PPBE process, provide the authors’ observations of 
base budget deviation, and concludes with limitations of the study and recommendations 
for further research. 
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V.   CONCLUSIONS OF ANALYSIS, LIMITATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Chapter IV concluded with the effects of the post 9/11 environment on the PPBE 
process and reasons for continued deviation from the process.  The continued deviation 
from the PPBE process carries consequences.  This chapter identifies and discusses these 
consequences.  Additionally, the researchers observed that PPBE deviation is not limited 
to the addition of supplementals; there is a deviation within the base budget process.  
These deviations are also identified and discussed within the chapter.  The chapter 
concludes with the identification of the limitations of the study and recommendations for 
further research. 
A.   CONSEQUENCES OF CONTINUED DEVIATIONS FROM PPBE 
The continued use of supplemental GWOT funding “fixes” the current lack of 
planning and programming in the PPBE process during the budgeting phase.  This 
indicates that PPBE is no longer the budgeting system being used; some type of just-in-
time budgeting system is now operating in its place.  The removal of the planning, 
programming and analytical aspects of PPBE from funding the war has allowed an 
erosion of budget discipline to occur.  This erosion has not been apparent to the casual 
observer; however, as the supplementals have created the illusion that DoD is operating 
within budget.  The reduced transparency of war costs inherent in supplementals has 
provided DoD with another source of funding and has reduced its need to make serious 
trade-offs in choosing between the needs and requirements that are ultimately funded.  
This method of war funding greatly increases the difficulty in separating the incremental 
costs to fund contingency operations and longer-term costs that would normally be 
funded through the base budget process.122  While supplemental funding is faster and 
more flexible than base budgeting, its reactionary nature means less thought goes into 
spending decisions and less effort goes into ensuring that resources are allocated 
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efficiently.  This can be observed in the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) 
Vehicles, which have been purchased to transport U.S. troops in Iraq.  MRAPs are a 
necessity because of the protection they provide troops.  However, the speed at which 
these items moved through the supplemental funding left many questions unanswered.  
According to an Army official:   
We don’t know what their (MRAPs) disposition will be because they 
cannot be used in the United States or most places that have paved roads.    
Another consequence of continued deviation from the PPBE process is distortion 
of the defense base budget; the just-in-time budgeting system created by use of 
supplementals in many cases ignores longer-term expenses.  An Army SES who works in 
the GWOT Supplemental process adds: 
A significant portion of what would have been our peace time optempo 
has gone out of the base and is only in the supplemental.  So if we have 22 
brigades on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, their home station training 
is nowhere in our base budget.  It should be. 
Additionally, procurement items in wartime supplementals provide a good 
example of this base budget distortion.  The adaptive insurgent-type enemy in GWOT has 
amplified the need to use technologically advanced weapons systems that are expensive 
to procure, operate and maintain.  As the need for weapon systems procurement and 
R&D has increased, alternatives to baseline budgeting were required to pay the bill for 
this spending.  War time supplementals have exploited the opportunity to “afford” these 
systems through the continued blurring of the line between supplemental and base budget 
items.  As stated by a previous Deputy Director of OSD PA&E:   
We (DoD) are now doing equipment purchases in supplementals.  That is 
another thing that takes the decision making out of the (PPBE) 
programming process and puts it into the services and comptroller.”  
These procurement items are generally far more expensive than their 
initial purchase price might imply. Many of these procurement items have 
large total life cycle costs (operating, support and disposal costs) which 
are invisible to the supplemental appropriation process.  These costs are 
real and will have to be included in the future baseline budgets.  These 
additional expenses will place even more strain on DoD’s budget.   
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The following quote from an Army official further supports this point:   
We have thousands of pieces of equipment in the U.S. Army that was 
purchased with supplemental dollars that didn’t exist when we began the 
war…certainly not the models that we have upgraded to.  The sustainment 
costs for those don’t go away if we come out of the war.  I am going to 
mention MRAPs again.  So you have MRAPs now.  You bought them 
with supplemental money and you are operating and maintaining them 
with supplemental money.  There is absolutely no [base] budget visibility 
of MRAPs. 
With these types of items migrating from the base budget to supplementals, it is 
evident that the base budget process (PPBE) is not able to cope with and address world 
events in real time. 
DoD’s reliance on supplemental appropriations as an off-budget method to fund 
GWOT is symptomatic of the entire Federal government’s lack of fiscal discipline.  The 
current spending path projects expenditures far exceeding revenues now and into the 
foreseeable future.  The way in which the U.S. is financing GWOT exacerbates this 
problem.  As mentioned earlier, the wartime supplementals are adding to the deficit, 
which increases the national debt.123  This indicates that the overall budget strategy needs 
to be addressed and federal spending must be reviewed in its entirety to capture the entire 
picture of the nation’s financial condition.   
B.   BASE BUDGET DEVIATION 
Deviation from PPBE is not simply the addition of supplementals; there are 
deviations occurring within the base budget process as well.  Despite the indications 
presented in Chapter II that PPBE is a deliberate and static process incorporating years of 
planning and programming to formulate each budget, this is an idealized depiction of the 
process.  For this ideal to be realized, the PPBE system would have to remain relatively 
unchanged over time to allow constant and comparable outputs.  This research revealed 
that, in reality, the PPBE system is modified by nearly every new administration.  In the 
words of a former Deputy Director of OSD PA&E: 
                                                 
123 United States Government Accountability Office, “Making Tough Budget Choices to Create a 
Better Future,” United States Government Accountability Office,. PowerPoint, Slide 10, (March 12, 2008), 
http://www.gao.gov/cghome/d08604cg.pdf (accessed June 4, 2008). 
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There have been large variations in PPB/PPBE between administrations.  
The PPB that existed when Rumsfeld came in bears little resemblance to 
the one used under McNamara.  The first phase of PPB, in the 1960’s, was 
the original systems analysis.  The second phase started with Laird in 1969 
and it went through the Nixon years and Ford.  The Carter administration 
brought back unified guidance, which went back some degree to the 
original PPB.  Then you had the Reagan years when they got rid of unified 
guidance and there was a period of very bureaucratized PPB.  During 
Bush I when Cheney was SECDEF, PPB almost shutdown.  The Clinton 
years deliberately revived PPB and put in something that was groping 
towards a hybrid of the 1960’s and the 1970’s.  Then you had the first two 
years of Rumsfeld.  They neither amended the old system nor used it.  It 
was just, by and large, budgeting.  You had the Aldridge report in January 
of 2003, which proposed a new PPB, which was never implemented; it 
really only existed on paper.  Then you have the actual process that’s 
existed from roughly 2004 to date, which is marked by the absence of 
programming. 
The PPBE process has deviated from McNamara’s original process, with each 
administration adapting PPBE to match its own needs and definition.  Robert McNamara 
would not recognize today’s PPBE process. 
The lack of an effective strategy for addressing the insurgent nature of GWOT, 
mentioned earlier, has also forced a deviation from the PPBE process.  The purpose of 
program budgeting is to choose the most efficient and effective mix of programs in 
meeting the nation’s national security objectives.  An ineffective strategy results in 
ineffective programming.  PPBE has become not so much a strategy driven process as a 
budget driven process; operating within budget authority becomes the strategy and a 
combination of programs capable of handling all contingencies is required.  Clearly, a 
combination of programs that can satisfy all contingencies and fit within budgetary 
constraints is not possible.  Therefore, some new type of just-in-time budgeting system 
must be adopted that allows DoD to move outside of the PPBE process and secure more 
budget authority.  In the words of an Army official:  “I really think it is control number 
driving.  What can we afford?  Then we fix it in the supplemental.”  The timeline for 
PPBE, ideally, is driven by the need to deliver a budget on time.  Today, the content of 
PPBE is being driven by the budget, too.    
 65
The introduction of capabilities-based analysis also represents a deviation from 
PPBE.  This type of analysis places emphasis on developing capabilities rather than 
programs.  Its goal is to ensure the capabilities exist collectively to address national 
security threats.  Capabilities-based analysis is being used between the planning and 
programming phase as a form of risk mitigation.  It is still being adopted as a formal 
process and is not detailed in desktop budgeting manuals.  The introduction of this 
additional “phase” is somewhat puzzling.  If PPBE is followed, valid policy objectives 
are created from effective strategies; actual programming occurs and produces the 
capabilities that satisfy policy objectives.  This would render capabilities-based analysis 
unnecessary.  Programs produce capabilities; capabilities do not produce programs.  This 
informal insertion of capabilities-based planning into the PPBE process blurs and 
complicates the roles and responsibilities inherent to the system.  According to an Army 
official, “We have added a step to an already compressed timeline.  We are doing a 
quicker review and I am really worried about the quality of the analysis that is going on 
in between.” 
The blurring of the line between baseline and supplementals, the changing of the 
PPBE system by each administration, the budget dictating PPBE content, and the 
introduction of capabilities based planning into the process all indicate that deviation 
from the PPBE process runs deeper than the mere addition of wartime supplementals.  
Deviation within the base budget process is also occurring in an attempt to find a 
budgeting system that can keep pace with the dynamic nature of the post 9/11 
environment. 
C.   STUDY LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
While the authors had access to a sample of senior officials who provided timely 
and reliable insight, access to additional personnel involved in more areas of the 
budgeting and legislative processes and additional time would have yielded a more in-
depth analysis of the current processes used by DoD.  Additionally, access to the 
architects of the initial PPB system might have provided a more thorough perspective on 
today’s budgeting system.  The study identifies that deviation from the PPBE process is 
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occurring but insufficient time was available to document the ad hoc and just-in-time 
budget system accurately and completely that is now in effect.  Further study is warranted 
into the current budgeting practices and documentation of this process by an individual or 
group of researchers would prove useful in identifying and categorizing the budget 
process.  While this study does identify the causes and consequences of continued PPBE 
deviation, it does not address how to correct the problems.  
A detailed analysis of a future plan to remove the dependency of DoD on 
supplemental appropriations for GWOT funding was beyond the scope of this study.  
DoD has become accustomed to this money and has put it to use by purchasing items that 
would otherwise not be affordable.  A study to develop a formal plan to gradually wean 
DoD from the dependence on supplemental appropriations would be beneficial. 
The terms “uncertainty” and “emergency” have been continually cited by the 
Executive and Legislative Branches as the reason for the continued use of supplemental 
appropriations in funding GWOT.  Further research could explore the use of these terms 
and conditions to analyze the extent to which they have been exploited and manipulated 
to allow the continued use of supplemental appropriations as the primary mechanism for 
funding GWOT.  PPBE has not been utilized in earnest as a method for funding GWOT.  
Is this because the powers that be thought it would not work or because GWOT presented 
the opportunity to secure more funding through supplemental appropriations than through 
baseline budgeting procedures?                                       
An additional area of further research entails the historic pattern of PPBE 
variations instituted by different presidential administrations.  As stated by a previous 
Deputy Director of OSD PA&E: 
There were large variations between administrations.  You probably have 
four or five very, very different PPBE systems in the last forty years.  The 
PPB system that existed when Donald Rumsfeld came in bears little 
resemblance to the original one under Robert McNamara. 
If the use of PPBE is in name only and has the flexibility to be tailored to great 
extents, is it truly the formal structure that it appears to be? 
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